Introduction
In planning theory, following the new institutionalist debates in sociology, economics and political science, much attention has been given lately to institutions, both formal (like norms and rules) and informal (like values, conventions and codes of behaviour) institutions. In line with this, institutional change has also been a central element in the debates in planning theory since the early nineties (see for instance Bolan, 1991; Gualini, 2002; Healey et al., 2002; Innes, 1995; Alexander, 2000) .
According to Innes (1995) , the essence of planning is institutional design. In line with this, much is written on building institutional capacity in recent years. The goal usually is to find ways in which agents can unfold their creative practices to adapt to changes, within collaborative processes, in order to break through the institutional pathways and their structural force (Healey et al., 2002; Healey, 1998) .
However valuable, it puts the main emphasis on the normative side of institutional change, in other words, how it could and should be done.
What is rare in the field of planning, is a plausible theory of how institutional change actually occurs. Why and when do institutions change?
Some (e.g. Gualini, 2001) prefer to think in a dichotomy in which design is set against institutional evolution or building. We want to go beyond the often raised dichotomy of design versus evolution. Although our perspective might be applicable to institutional change in a broader sense, here we confine ourselves to institutions that are relevant to planning.
This paper is structured as follows. Section Two illuminates four perspectives on institutional change, followed by a synthesis on institutional change (section Three). After the framework has been established, two empirical examples will be discussed to illustrate how it can structure our thinking on institutional change. But not only do they serve as an illustration of the conceptual framework, vice versa, this framework has benefited from and been informed by the empirical knowledge on the changes in practices and structures in regionalisation and land policy.
Both examples come from the Netherlands. The first example deals with the attempts to anchor (i.e. institutionalise) the city-province into (and therewith change) the Dutch state structure (section Four). The second example regards the convention of active land policy by Dutch municipalities, and the changes within that convention (section Five). We have chosen two quite different cases, in order to illuminate the applicability of the framework. One difference is the state of institutionalisation, which is regarded as the process in which behaviour and discourses become anchored (a more elaborate treatment follows). The city-provinces have not been formally institutionalised (yet) because the state structure shows great inertia. In the case of land policy, we see the opposite: here active land policy has become institutionalised (i.e. became a generally acknowledged convention) since the second World War and follows a certain path of development, leading to all sorts of attempts to reinforce it. Another difference is that active land policy is an informal institution, whereas the city-province comprises formal institutions. A third difference is that active land policy is used to achieve spatial policy goals, whereas the city-province serves political-administrative goals in more general terms in the light of territorial governance. But both cases are examples of institutional change in the way space is administratively organised. Finally, section Six concludes by discussing how lessons drawn from the cases bear on our framework of institutional change.
Institutional change: beyond the design versus evolution dichotomy
Do institutions stem primarily from intentional design or from unintentional, gradual processes of solidifying? The literature on institutional development has brought (at least) forth different views on this issue. Some approaches tend towards an organic interpretation, while others acknowledge the role of intentional shaping and creation of institutions, that is, of institutional design. This section will first give an overview of the main perspectives on institutional design versus evolution. Four perspectives are of particular interest for our discussion here, namely the emphasis on institutional design, the institutional and evolutionary economists' emphasis on selection through efficiency, North's account of path dependency, and the sociological perspective on institutional change.
One of the major advocates of the 'institutional design' approach in the literature is Bromley (1991) , who regards institutions explicitly as 'relations' that can be deliberately created. In other words, they stem from institutional design. Alexander (2002a, which meant that all development became subject to approval by the government (which delegated it to the local planning authorities).
The problem with such a strong emphasis on design and therewith an instrumentalist view on institutional change is that it cannot explain why, out of a large number of alternatives, particular institutions are chosen in particular times and places while others are not, and why only certain institutions survive in the long term. To avoid an overly voluntaristic view, therefore, a theorisation of institutional development and selection is required.
In the second perspective, it is assumed that institutions evolve through organic variation and are selected on the basis of their efficiency.
This vision of institutional change draws from insights of Hayek (1960) , and evolutionary economists. The basic setting for facilitating both variation and selection is the market in which individuals rationally pursue their selfinterests (see for instance Webster & Lai, 2003) . The market is so effective in inducing variation and efficiency-based selection that there is hardly any scope for comprehensive forms of institutional design, i.e. for 'state planning' interfering with market processes besides the public creation and enforcement of private property rights and basic corrections of 'market failure' (Webster & Lai, 2003) . In the context of land use institutions, for instance, an important capacity of markets is its ability to reassign property rights (so to change institutions) in response to changes in resource value.
The efficiency view has inspired a particular strand in economics that has further explored the development of institutions, namely transaction cost economics (Demsetz, 1967; Williamson, 1985) . In this view, institutions evolve to minimise transaction costs, in order to increase economic efficiency. Market proponents (Webster & Lai, 2003) use the transaction cost argument to defend their thesis that markets, as an assembly of institutions, reduce (spontaneously) the costs of organising a multitude of individual transactions. Yet, critical observers (Hodgson, 1993) were quick to point out that there is no evidence that institutional developments, notably in the field of policy, are leading to higher levels of economic efficiency. The question then arises, what may explain the perseverance of institutions that support inefficient forms of organising and policy-making?
To explain the efficiency lacuna, institutional economists pointed at a complicating factor in the relationship between transaction costs and institutional evolution. The emergence of particular institutions may not only alter transactions costs, it is also, in itself, subject to transaction costs (Furubotn & Richter, 1991) . Institutional economic perspectives thus took on board a new core element in the explanation of institutional development, namely the role of history. The most prominent contributor to this line of thinking is Nobel Prize winner Douglas North. In his view, "The major role of institutions in a society is to reduce uncertainty by establishing a stable (but not necessarily efficient) structure to human interaction" (North, 1990 , page 6). North argues that the "structure for human interaction" also bears on future institutional changes. In other words, history matters. In a world of uncertainty and imperfect information, the history of institutions has a large effect on the way institutions are shaped today. The result is an institutional path, where the direction taken at each crossroads limits the scope for future variation. Past turns thus lock in future development. What is particularly important is the dynamic nature of this path. A certain institutional path generates learning effects, that contribute to either a higher quality of the product or to a lower price (Boschma & Lambooy, 1999) .
To what extent does a historical perspective assign a role to institutional design? In North's (1990) view some institutions evolve by themselves while others are deliberately created: "Institutions may be created, as was the case the United States Constitution; or they may simply evolve over time, as does the common law" (see for similar statements Scharpf, 1997; Gualini, 2001 ). Yet the scope of this design is strongly pathdependent, i.e. determined by past experiences, and place-dependent, i.e.
determined by geopolitical contingencies. In essence, institutional design comes down to the articulation and advocacy of one of the many options brought up by a particular historical trajectory at a certain place. Institutions thus result from a historical path that is punctuated by acts of purposeful design (Weimer, 1995) .
While, by taking into account the costs of institutional change, North and other historical economists have qualified the basic efficiency criterion applied by institutional economists, their perspective remains strongly rooted in an approach that features the economic instrumentality of institutions. It is this instrumentality that is challenged by more critical approaches. In his seminal publication 'Economics and evolution: bringing life back into economics', Hodgson (1993) criticises economic instrumentality for ignoring power inequalities and argues that institutions will persist if they serve the actors or coalitions in power, independent of the question whether they are efficient or not. Yet, while assessing institutional change in political rather than economic terms, even power-based approaches tend to adopt an instrumental view of institutions, by explaining their development in terms of the way powerful actors shape institutions to achieve a desirable 'mobilisation of bias' (Schattschneider, 1960) . A problem with this approach is that it leads to the expectation that power asymmetries would be able to reproduce and even strengthen themselves by the manipulation of the 'rules of the games', something which does not seem to be generally endorsed by the recent history of, in particular, the Western World (Weimer, 1995, page 7) . There are many examples, as exemplified by processes of democratisation and social emancipation, where institutional change has been induced by actors and through processes initially operating at the margin of societal arenas.
How can we account for the fact that institutional change may not be accompanied by increasing efficiency? How can we explain that institutional change does not seem to exacerbate power asymmetries? The fourth perspective, drawing from sociological thinking, sheds light on these questions by rejecting an instrumentalist perspective on institutional change and putting forward an alternative approach.
Many sociological institutionalists replace the means-end rationality of the efficiency approaches, and the 'mobilisation of bias' perspective of powerbased approaches, by drawing attention to the symbolic and cognitive dimensions of institutions and institutional change (March & Olsen, 1989 Institutions are devised and adopted principally because of their social appropriateness and legitimacy. Institutional development follows a 'logic of social appropriateness' rather than a 'logic of instrumentality' (March & Olsen, 1989 based on two strands. First, a decisional strand, with emphasis on producing solutions to problems. Second a dialogical approach, with emphasis on the socially embedded process of institutionalisation. The implication is that, in their words, "design will require conscious efforts at changing the cultural as well as ideational elements of the institution as well as its structural elements" (Linder & Peters, 1995, page 133) . In a more precise way, we could perceive the decisional manifestations of institutional design, in which action is justified and advocated on the basis of a 'logic of instrumentality' or a 'technical rationality', as a key cultural resource in the process of institutional bricolage. As the daily stream of advisory reports and technical consultations accompanying the processes of institutional design shows, discursive 'proofs' of instrumentality are in fact a major factor in the 'logic of social appropriateness' that drives institutional development.
Towards a model of institutional change
What remains a conundrum is the extent and nature of autonomy enjoyed by agents pursuing institutional change, the so-called 'bricoleurs'. Some authors put considerable faith in the transformative capacity of agents. De Jong (1999, page 52), for instance, defines institutional design as "… the deliberate and methodically structured adaptation of a system to meet external quality requirements by manipulating elements and relationships."
There are two factors that may, in particular, contribute to such transformative capacity. First is the capacity of agents and organisations driving institutional change to gain societal recognition, trust, legitimacy through building identity, leadership, and operational competence (Boin & Kofman-Bos, 2003) , things, as we will see, that were lacking in the first case (Section Four). Second is the capacity of the 'system' to learn and act upon this learning, i.e. the capacity for institutional reflection. Institutional design requires a capacity for 'triple-loop action learning' (Gualini, 2001, page 37), which makes processes of institutionalisation and the way they are action. Yet, where most historical institutionalists consider rupture as primarily externally triggered (Hall & Taylor, 1996) , notably through crises, Burch et al argue that many incidences of institutional change are actually internally driven. The accumulation of gradual pressure for change from within or from the margin, in the form of critical reflection by agencies, proposals for institutional (re)design, and promotional action, may produce incremental change.
In the terminology of Burch et al (2003) , when there is sufficient pressure, whether internally or externally driven, a 'critical moment' for change arrives. Existing institutional structures become questioned and emerge on the agenda. There is scope for internal as well external actors to jockey for new positions. If the opportunity is grasped and changes are realised, the critical moment turns into a critical juncture encompassing a break with past patterns, inducing the overhaul of 'discursive hegemonies' (Hajer, 1995, page 59) , through which institutional transformations may occur 1 . Distinguishing 'critical junctures' from 'critical moments' may thus help to explain how institutional transformations actually take place. analysing the conditions under which, after a critical moment has emerged, a critical juncture is reached. It is here that we propose to introduce another conceptual step in our explanatory framework, based on Kingdon's (1995) theory on policy agenda setting. Kingdon conceptualises the critical condition for policy transformation in terms of the concurrence of three 'streams' of development. These streams are (a) the societal problems that are conceived important, (b) the policy solutions at hand (e.g. suggestions of institutional (re)design) and (c) political endorsement and action. The matching of the three streams results in a 'window of opportunity', which is the critical juncture in the words of Burch et al (2003) .
Figure 1: A model of institutional change
The addition of Kingdon's condition for policy transformation to the earlier exploration results in a staged approach as depicted in Figure 1 . The starting point is an existing institutional arrangement, accompanied by a discursive hegemony. Again, two interrelated developments affect the hegemonic discourse and therewith the position of the institutional arrangement and make it malleable. First, the stream of reflection, alternative ideas distinction between rational choice, historical and sociological institutionalism (Hall & Taylor, 1996) , since in her view those have difficulties to explain change.
(solutions) and actions of the institutional bricoleurs that challenge the present stable situation; second, external societal developments, notably those that put the present institutional arrangement under strain. The first window of opportunity opens when one of these developments, or a combination of both, exerts sufficient pressure, as to open up the discursive arena. So it is through a change in discourses and discursive hegemonies that institutions become challenged. What might also happen is that although an institutional arrangement is no longer supported by a hegemonic discourse, it might persevere because external and internal pressures are not strong enough to create a critical moment (Pestman, 2001 ).
Those could be institutions that are neither functional nor dysfunctional.
When the existing institutional arrangement is successfully challenged, the result is a critical moment in which there is scope for opponents to jockey for new positions and for alternative ideas to gain support. Yet whether such a change is really effectuated depends on the opening of a second window of opportunity: the critical juncture. So one condition for this window is an institutionally, politically and discursively defined critical moment, comparable to Kingdon's political stream. In addition, the window requires the alignment of powerful alternative ideas and problem perceptions, corresponding to Kingdon's other two streams.
For our purpose, relevant ideas are especially those centred around institutional (re)design. Problem perceptions are influenced, on the other hand, by the way agents translate perceived societal developments into problems that require attention. What is especially important in this stage is that the matching involves a particular confluence of the problem and solution streams, out of possibly many alternatives. When the opening of the window is followed by a consolidation of a particular problem-solution combination, a critical juncture is reached resulting in institutional transformation.
It is important to note that our staged approach, like its components, should be read as an analytical rather than a historical model. In the messy reality of institutional change, the two windows of opportunity, as well as Regarding its competencies, the body faced a persistent tension between its status as a supra-and inter-municipal body.
Yet, soon after its establishment, conflicts started to arise between the municipality of Rotterdam and the Rijnmond about the interests of the seaport, which paralysed the governance and integration process (Flierman, 1994, p 265-266) . In general, municipalities fiercely resisted what was conceived to be a rather technocratic and top-down imposed Rijnmond.
Neighbouring municipalities, in particular, feared the loss of political weight and power (Flierman & Pröpper, 1997) . Like before, the history of this attempt showed the 'bricolage'
induced by the way the desire to bring about more fundamental changes was thwarted by the legacy of the past. Initially, the proposal made by OOR representatives was to install a metropolitan government as a complete new (and fourth) administrative tier, but this was considered as constitutionally too complex and was blocked by the Ministry of Home Affairs. Therefore the proposed urban regional body was given the status of province (Derksen, 1996) . In order to keep all parties on board, the design also , 1999) . Similarly, the suburban municipalities, especially the weaker ones, were afraid that they would be overshadowed by
Rotterdam (or what would be left it) and lose authority over their own territory. In addition, local authorities were also wary of a regional authority that would be much more proactive and authoritative than the existing provincial administrations used to be. This fear was compounded by a continuing dispute about the division of competencies between the local and regional level, and a lack of local leaders who could act as transformative agents (Van Der Meer & Van Hoek, 1999) . A final institutional opponent was the province, that saw its jurisdictions, plus accompanying resources and political influence, erode.
Common Provisions Act (WGR), in which participating municipalities commit themselves to a joint coordination of at least four statutory policy domains: spatial planning, economic development, transport and environment. In the end, history repeated itself once more. Instead of establishing strong city-provinces, the municipalities of the seven designated urban regions started their non-voluntary co-operation under the Framework Law in 1995. After almost ten years, the results of these 'weaker' designs of regional governance are mixed (Ipo, 2002) . In most cases, a regional land policy and regional financial exchange have not been realised; there is weak public affinity; a lack of decision-making transparency and persistent tensions with the provinces. On the other hand, all the municipalities within the urban regions showed their willingness to continue their non-voluntary co-operation through extension of the Framework Law, which might indicate that the urban regions are becoming more and more institutionally embedded. What remains a strong factor is that municipalities continue to be confronted with spatial problems that, as they also realise themselves, can only be solved through regional forms of governance, both in a more functional and democratic sense.
Why did the attempts to found a regional governance structure fail?
The case presents a clear indication of a persistent external pressure, which, when accompanied by an extended process of institutional reflection and political mobilisation, resulted in successive 'critical moments'. Moreover, various new institutional designs that appeared to provide solutions matching the 'regional' problems at hand made it to the first stage of actual implementation, close to approaching a 'critical juncture'. That, in the end, such junctures failed to happen has two general causes. First, attempts to genuinely (i.e. constitutionally) modify the 'House of Thorbecke' by adding an additional tier of governance created its own resistance, both institutionally and politically. So, while the political-institutional stream generated sufficient support for setting institutional change on the agenda, this was not followed up by an endorsement of the wider consequences carried by such change. Second, more focused resistance erupted against particular forms of institutional designs involving either the partial submergence or break-up of local authority. Since no 'strong' design managed to be successful (Schaap, 1997) , one had to resort to 'weak' designs that were largely accommodating the existing situation. The strengths of the critical moments thus stands in marked contrast with the unattainability of critical junctures. In other words: "[t]he Dutch case may illustrate the frustrating experiences with functionally brilliant government policies which are not rooted very well in the underlying institutional state structures and the deeper socio-cultural developments within society" (Toonen, 1998, page 149) . Indeed, one may wonder whether, change in the country's territorial governance can be brought about by internal dynamics alone, as suggested before. It may well be that he robustness of the House of Thorbecke means that a modification of territorial governance, despite continuing emphasis on the need for, and benefits of, change, will only materialise in the Netherlands under specific conditions such as occupation by a foreign power or a lurking revolution (Hooghe & Marks, 2001 ). On the other hand, no institutional set-up is permanent and it will be only a matter of time before new critical moments will open the windows of opportunity for 'bricoleurs' to manipulate the path of institutional evolution, perhaps with more success.
Land policy in the Netherlands
Many municipalities in the Netherlands pursue an active land policy, which in general involves land assembly and land development by the municipality, after which it often sells off the land for development by private developers or housing associations (see e.g. Needham, 1997 for a description of Dutch land policy). This tradition has persevered for over a couple of decades now (De Kam, 1996, page 222) . After World War II, a massive programme for subsidised housing that had to be implemented, for which the government took the initiative. The result of this programme is that the Netherlands has the highest percentage of social housing in Western Europe. Active land policy by municipalities was necessary to implement this programme.
Nowadays, the percentage of social housing is decreasing and the building task is far smaller than it used to be in the sixties and the seventies.
However, active land policy has retained its importance. One could say that after World War II the institutionalised practice of active land policy has always been supported by a hegemonic discourse, i.e. active state involvement in the production of space, despite the emergence of other discourses, like privatisation, since the eighties like in many other countries.
Municipalities stick to active land policy primarily for two reasons. The first reason is the grip the municipality can have on spatial development by using active land policy. In general, the planning system as laid out in the Dutch spatial planning act (WRO) and housing act does not provide sufficient means to achieve the ambitions of the local government. In a way, it is a negative system that prohibits some land use and hence allows other uses.
To implement policy and achieve the ambitions a more active strategy is needed.
The second reason is the financial benefit the municipality can make out of this active policy. With active land policy, the financial profits in the development process can be collected by the municipality, instead of 'leaking away' to developers and housing associations. In addition to the financial benefits, the municipalities can recoup plan costs and the costs of services like public space, social housing and infrastructure. Unlike the English planning system with its planning obligations or the American growth management with its concurrency (a 'pay-as-you-grow' strategy), the Dutch system is not capable of recouping the above mentioned costs.
Again, in the Dutch system certain land uses can only be prohibited, nothing can be imposed. Therefore, municipalities use active land policy. After the land has been developed, it is often sold off with conditions on future land use. This can give municipalities far-reaching control over development.
One could say that active land policy has become a convention, or an informal institution in North's words. It is taken for granted by both municipalities and developers 4 . One good example of the tradition of supplying serviced land by the municipality is the provision of land for industrial estates. In the Netherlands, there is an oversupply of land for industrial estates, i.e. beyond efficient allocation of resources (Needham & Louw, 2003) . This results in comparatively low land prices for commercial use. This is also good example of the statement earlier made that institutions do not necessarily move towards efficiency.
In 1993, the national government published the Fourth Report on Spatial Planning Extra (Vinex), in which it proposed extension areas (mainly greenfield locations) for urban growth. The local governments faced a problem they were hardly familiar with, namely an emerging involvement of and the co-operation with private developers. After (and even before) the Vinex was published, private developers rapidly started acquiring land on the proposed locations. In many cases they were able to acquire land ahead of local governments. This gave the developers a very strong position. Although municipalities still possess the majority of the land for development, namely 64% for Vinex locations and 68% for other locations (Korthals Altes & Groetelaers, 2000) , things have changed. Since then, active land policy by local governments has come under pressure.
Private developers are now common players on the land market and in spatial development. Following the framework we set out earlier, we could say that after the Vinex was published external pressure (arrow 1 in figure   1 ) was exerted (more private initiatives and diminishing dominance of local governments) on the hegemonic practice of active land policy with its instruments, which led to institutional reflection by central government, the main bricoleur in this case, and other stakeholders. The development that has been described has been followed by several measures taken by the state to strengthen the position of local governments.
Development permission
One example of an attempt by the state to get the institutions right is the proposed development permission 5 . Although at the moment of writing, no decision was taken yet, the process that is building up to that is worth illuminating.
land is developed. The advantage for the developer is the avoidance of risk in the land development stage. 5 A development permission is separate from a building or planning permission.
As said before, a municipality (when it owns the land) can impose conditions on the buyer, which is often a private developer or a housing association. Often, these conditions also comprise the recouping of costs made by the municipality, like the costs of plan-making and the costs of public services like parks and infrastructure. (Grondexploitatie in nieuwe bouwlocaties) before the Ministry came with more concrete proposals. The regained political attention was the result of a discussion after the renewed act on pre-emption rights (WVG), to increase the possibilities of active land policy, was passed.
Central to the proposed development fee was that it should be used as last resort, in cases when developers and municipalities failed to come to a 'voluntary' development agreement (under private law). The core of this new instrument was supported by a broad coalition. Among them were two 6 The described process that builds up the presentation of the development permission stems to some extent from Groetelaers (2004) . version. In this version, not only plan costs can be recouped, but developers can also be obliged to provide public facilities like infrastructure and green space. Until today, no final decision has been made. The critical moment is still there and there is no question that a juncture will occur, only when and for which version of the development permission remains to be seen.
Although the development permission seems to be a break with the path of active land policy, it must be seen as a form of institutional design in the evolution of land policy. Active land policy remains the prevailing land strategy, supplemented with an instrument based on public law that can be used when active land acquisition is not possible. More, the history of, and the benefits achieved by, active land policy have had and have an enormous impact on the desire to adopt an instrument under public law that can achieve similar results.
Conclusion
How can we explain institutional change? We started this paper with distinguishing four perspectives addressing this question. Of the three economically oriented perspectives, North's approach, in which an important role is given to the history of institutions, seems to be the most 
